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Profits in the Pie of the Beholder 
By: Daniel Corsten and  Nirmalya  Kumar 
Harvard Business Review, May 2003, Vol. 81, Issue 5, pp.  
 
Suppliers feel burned by "efficient consumer response" initiatives. But what if they just can't see the rewards? 
 
Inspired by the apparel industry's supply chain innovations in the 1980% the food industry launched the "efficient 
consumer response" movement in 1992. ECR promised big payoffs for grocery retailers, suppliers, and consumers 
through sweeping supplier-reseller collaborations. It required that retailers, manufacturers, and third-party 
resellers abandon their mutual suspicion and energetically cooperate to streamline the processes involved in 
sorting, replenishing, promoting, and introducing goods in supermarkets. The expected reward? Better forecasts 
of product demand, more efficient use of store and warehouse space, increased sales and category share, 
decreased inventories and stockouts, reduced expenses for product promotions, fewer new-product failures, and 
lower administrative costs. 
Early on, Kurt Salmon, a retail-consulting firm, demonstrated that ECR could reduce costs in the supermarket 
distribution chain by about 11%, which would translate into annual industry savings of $30 billion in the United 
States and $33 billion in Europe. Companies in the United States, South America, Europe, and Asia responded by 
launching national ECR initiatives. Retailers and suppliers joined hands with sudden enthusiasm and invested 
heavily in ECR training, infrastructure, and processes. 
But by the late 1990s, it seemed the payoffs had yet to materialize. As far as suppliers were concerned, the lean 
supply chain simply fattened the wallets of powerful retailers like Carrefour and Metro, who all the while pressed 
suppliers to make more and more investments in ECR practices. For example, with category management, a 
common ECR initiative, retailers effectively outsource the cost of data crunching and market research to 
suppliers. Having taken on those costs, suppliers generally perceive the benefits of the category management 
program as flowing mainly to the retailer. Articles in the trade press captured the growing skepticism about ECR 
with headlines like: "ECR Breakthrough. A-a-a-any Day Now!" "ECR: More Promise Than Performance?" and, 
simply, "ECR Is Dead" 
 
A Raw Deal? 
Today, suppliers are increasingly apathetic about ECR collaborations. As the CEO of one of the largest packaged-
goods companies in the world told us, "If there was a dollar to be made from ECR, I haven't seen it." But no one 
had actually tested empirically the suppliers' conviction that they're getting a raw deal. So we decided to more 
closely examine the relationship between ECR adoption and performance among suppliers of Sainsbury's 
Supermarkets, one of the world's top 20 retailers. Sainsbury's had asked all its suppliers to adopt ECR practices, 
and most did to varying degrees. Although the retailer had documented ECR's benefits to its own operations, it 
was unsure whether its suppliers were receiving corresponding benefits. 
Between autumn of 2000 and spring of 2001, we surveyed a representative sample of 266 Sainsbury's suppliers 
about their ECR relationships with the grocer, the perceived benefits of their ECR activities, and how equitable 
they felt the arrangement was. The sample included small and large suppliers as well as private-label and branded 
suppliers. We also studied archival data on the suppliers' economic performance and compared them with the 
  
 
companies' implementation of 33 different ECR practices. For each product category in a supplier's business with 
Sainsbury's, we compared sales, profit, and growth performance with the supplier's performance at other retailers 
and in other categories. 
Though many suppliers would disagree, we found that they clearly benefit from ECR. In fact, the more ECR 
practices they adopted in their relationship with Sainsbury's, the higher their Sainsbury's-related economic 
performance. At the same time, the more the supplier collaborated with the retailer on ECR, the less fairly treated 
they felt. Why would this be? Retailers benefit substantially from ECR, but they've made fewer investments in it 
than suppliers have. If suppliers believe they are making most of the investments while retailers are receiving the 
lion's share of the benefits, they're bound to feel taken advantage of. This perceived inequity, accurate or not, 
harms relationships and can obscure real performance gains. And that can lead suppliers to doubt whether they've 
received any return from ECR at all. 
 
A Matter of Trust 
Large retailers do have a tremendous power advantage over suppliers. Given that power, suppliers often have little 
choice but to comply and accept the uneven, but still positive, returns from ECR. However, both suppliers and 
retailers would do well to reexamine how they approach their ECR collaboration. If disillusioned suppliers make 
only halfhearted attempts to implement ECR--which is increasingly the case--they hurt their own performance. It 
would be wise for suppliers to manage their perceptions of inequity and accept some imbalance as the cost of 
doing business, particularly given the gains to be had. 
Meanwhile, retailers should be concerned about suppliers' disillusionment with ECR relationships and direct more 
energy into building trust with them. Perhaps retailers could take on more of the investment in ECR as a good-
faith measure, find a more fair way to distribute profits, or invest in technologies and processes that could help 
them better assess their relationships with their suppliers. For example, Sainsbury's shares its performance data 
with its suppliers via an extranet and regularly reviews its relationships with suppliers using a balanced ECR 
scorecard. 
If suppliers aren't fully committed to ECR, retailers, too, stand to lose. 
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